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meme	theory	presented	by	Dawkins	and	Boyer	(which	helps	us	to	understand	how	religious	beliefs	change	conceptually	across	time	via	cultural	transmission	and	via	the	various	mechanisms	in	place	that	affect	how	well	we	retain	certain	types	of	beliefs),	Wilson’s	“multi-level	selection”	take	on	religious	beliefs	goes	a	long	way	toward	accounting	for	the	vastly	diverse	bodies	of	god-beliefs	that	we	observe	across	human	cultures	across	time.			 As	such,	I	believe	that	we	can	reasonably	conclude	that	the	diversity	of	god-beliefs	in	human	experience	is	largely	explained	by:	1. The	byproduct	raw	god-beliefs	provided	by	our	RGCMs,	2. The	processes	of	cultural	evolution	and	multilevel	selection,	and	the	adaptive	advantage	conferred	to	a	cultural	group	by	its	respective	refined	god-beliefs	(this	includes	meme	theory	and	the	different	rates	of	success	of	“copy	me”	programs	in	the	cultural	transmission	of	god-beliefs),	and	3. The	manifold	of	human	experience	(i.e.,	across	time,	people	have	experienced	the	world	in	radically	different	environments	and	with	radically	different	historical	contingencies).	 	
Each	of	these	is	a	crucial	factor	in	understanding	the	origin,	development,	and	diversity	of	our	god-beliefs.	
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C.		Adaptive	Cost/Benefit	Analysis	
	 One	way	to	proceed	in	considering	the	notion	that	our	various	god-beliefs	may	be	adaptations	(either	cultural	or	biological)	is	to	perform	a	cost/benefit	analysis	of	sorts.		We	need	to	weigh	the	costs	of	religion	against	the	benefits	to	determine	if	we	can	plausibly	believe	that	religious	systems	might	have	conferred	adaptive	benefit	to	their	respective	adherents.		Fortunately,	the	body	of	research	in	this	particular	area	is	rich.		With	a	few	exceptions,	the	literature	indicates	that	we	have	good	reason	for	believing	that	religious	beliefs	and	systems	are	adaptations	at	the	group	level,	and	that	refined	god-beliefs	also	confer	adaptive	benefits	to	individual	believers.		Before	we	proceed	into	the	details,	it	will	be	useful	to	keep	in	mind	that	our	god-beliefs	are	operating	at	two	different	levels—the	
intuitive	level	and	the	reflective	level.		At	the	reflective	level	are	what	I	have	termed	our	
refined	god-beliefs;	these	are	the	more	sophisticated,	inferential,	and	socially	oriented	beliefs.		At	the	intuitive	level	are	what	I	have	termed	our	raw	god-beliefs;	these	are	the	byproducts	of	our	normal	cognitive	processes.		We	have	conceived	of	these	raw	god-beliefs	as	the	bare	foundations	for	the	construction	of	refined	god-beliefs.		Between	these	two	levels,	there	is	a	“cognitive	gap”;	the	former	are	evolutionarily	ancient	and	cognitively	easy,	while	the	latter	are	evolutionarily	recent	and	tend	to	be	much	more	cognitively	difficult.	These	two	“levels”	warrant	different	empirical	approaches.		Anthropologists	and	social	scientists	of	religion	have	made	the	societal-level	refined	god-beliefs	the	target	of	their	work,	while	evolutionary	psychologists	and	cognitive	scientists	of	religion	have	targeted	the	cognitive-level,	raw	god-beliefs	with	their	work.		Since	the	social	religious	beliefs	are	evolutionarily	recent	(recent,	that	is,	relative	to	the	evolutionarily	ancient	intuitions	offered	to	us	by	our	RGCMs),	the	study	of	modern	religious	systems	is	relevant	to	
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understanding	their	adaptive	benefit.		Since	the	cognitive	religious	beliefs	are	evolutionarily	ancient,	the	study	of	modern	religious	systems	is	quite	irrelevant	to	understanding	the	underlying	cognitive	mechanisms	(unless	we	are	considering	how	our	
raw	god-beliefs	might	have	given	rise	to	our	refined	god-beliefs);	the	psychological	study	of	the	relevant	cognitive	mechanisms,	though,	does	give	us	valuable	insight	into	how	our	raw	
god-beliefs	may	have	helped	us	to	survive	ancient	environments.		Both	approaches—the	cognitive	and	the	anthropological—ultimately	appeal	to	evolutionary	processes.	So,	I	now	officially	propose:		“Refined	god-beliefs	are	adaptively	advantageous,	both	for	individual	organisms	and	for	groups.”42		The	next	part	of	the	paper	will	serve	to	examine	this	proposition.		By	no	means	will	this	section	be	a	comprehensive	examination	of	the	adaptive	costs	and	benefits	of	religion.		Rather,	I	will	hit	the	main	talking	points	of	those	who	advocate	for	the	fitness-enhancing	nature	of	our	god-beliefs.		I	will	do	my	best	to	avoid	evolutionary	“just-so”	stories—convenient,	ad	hoc	explanatory	hypotheses	that	often	come	under	fire	from	the	critics	of	evolutionary	theory—and	will	instead	stick	to	the	task	of	showing	the	reasonability	of	believing	that	religious	beliefs	are	fitness-conferring	adaptations.	
C-1.		Cost,	or	Investment?	
		 On	the	face	of	things,	god-beliefs	as	we	know	them	today—systematized	worldviews	with	values	and	goals	that	are	seemingly	opposed	to	humans’	adaptive	advantage—seem	incredibly	maladaptive.		Many	religious	systems	establish	moral	boundaries	in	the	areas	of	procreation,	bodily	defense,	and	the	accumulation	of	personal	resources,	and	this	seems	to	be	a	sure-fire	strategy	for	evolutionary	failure.		Yet,	here	we	are	today,	with	entire	lists	of																																																									42	In	all	cases,	refined	god-beliefs	are	transmitted	culturally.	
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thou	shall	not’s	that	place	restrictions	on	things	like	extra-marital	sex,	violence,	and	material	abundance.		At	first	glance,	this	seems	an	unwise	evolutionary	strategy.		After	all,	in	the	natural	world	the	winners	are	those	who	can	reproduce	successfully	(relative	to	others),	kill	their	enemies,	and	not	starve	to	death.			 That	considered,	if	we	are	to	propose	that	god-beliefs	are	adaptations,	rather	than	maladaptations,	we	must	contend	that	the	benefits	to	religious	believers	outweigh	the	apparent	costs.		Boyer	and	Bergstrom	(2008)	have	done	just	that,	attacking	the	apparent	costs	head-on:	A	striking	characteristic	of	most	religious	thought	and	behavior	is	that	they	do	not	seem	to	confer	any	direct	fitness	advantage	on	the	practitioners.		So,	from	an	evolutionary	viewpoint,	most	religious	phenomena	might	seem	to	be	either	maladaptive	or	adaptively	neutral.43		However,	evolutionary	biology	also	documents	specific	ways	in	which	fitness	costs	can	become	adaptive.		This	is	particularly	so	in	the	case	of	signaling,	an	area	of	intense	work	in	recent	evolutionary	biology…	Signaling	requires	the	coevolution	of	sender	and	receiver	capacities…	biologists	have	focused	especially	on	costly	signals,	which	are	reliable	because	they	are	difficult	to	fake	and	thereby	provide	direct	indices	of	the	fitness	qualities	they	are	supposed	to	advertise.44			Boyer	and	Bergstrom	have	proposed	that,	while	religion	is	what	they	call	a	“costly	signal,”	the	successful	performance	of	such	a	costly	signal	actually	leads	to	greater	adaptive	benefit	at	some	later	point,	as	a	“delayed	reward.”		They	point	out,	“Cooperation	often	requires	that	people	sacrifice	an	immediate	benefit	for	a	delayed	reward.”		So,	their	notion	of	religious	belief	as	a	costly	signal	only	works	if	we	understand	religious	belief	in	the	context	of	intra-group	relationships.		Their	conception	of	religious	beliefs	as	costly	signals	helps	us	to	
																																																								43	Boyer	&	Bergstrom,	2008,	pg.	115.	44	Ibid.,	pg.	115.	
	51	
understand	the	adaptive	benefits	of	religion	in	terms	of	the	adaptive	benefits	of	group	membership,	relations,	and	cooperation.	Boyer	and	Bergstrom	(2008)	discuss	the	costs	and	benefits	of	the	performance	of	such	costly	signals:	In	a	more	general	way,	religious	thought	and	behavior	would	seem	to	mobilize	cognitive	resources	away	from	survival	and	reproduction,	being	focused	on	nonphysical	imagined	agency.		Assuming	that	religious	activity	is	costly,	does	it	provide	signals?		To	a	large	extent	it	does,	given	that	most	activity	of	this	kind	is	both	public	and	formalized,	so	that	people’s	commitments	to	the	local	ritual	system	are	observable	by	all	(Sosis	2003).		On	the	basis	of	a	comparative	study	of	small	communities,	Sosis	showed	that	cost	is	indeed	an	important	factor.		Religious	groups	that	require	a	greater	investment	in	costly	rituals	tend	to	remain	more	cohesive…45			If	their	story	is	correct,	it	indicates	that	group-membership	and	the	adaptive	benefits	thereof	are	more	advantageous	to	the	individual	than	are	the	individual’s	abilities	to	cognize	about	non-religious	things	(like	survival	and	reproduction).		They	do	not	say	it	so	boldly,	but	the	proposal	is	essentially	something	like:		the	precious	resources	spent	on	religious	thought	and	ritual	are	a	drop	in	the	bucket	compared	to	the	resources	gained	by	group	identity,	intra-group	trust,	reciprocated	altruism,	shared	resources,	etc.		At	the	very	least,	the	costs	are	eventually	outweighed.		So,	perhaps	such	costly	religious	signals	are	best	regarded	not	as	being	adaptively	beneficial	or	costly,	but	as	being	adaptive	investments.				 Religious	signaling	is	an	especially	effective	mechanism	for	communicating	group	identification,	because	a	religious	signal	tends	to	be	a	binding	signal.		In	one	sense,	religious	signals	are	“binding”	just	in	that	they	tend	to	be	costly.		Costly	religious	signals	tie	one	to	one’s	religious	community	in	important	ways—significant	resources,	time,	and	energy	are	spent	in	participating	in	a	group’s	religious	identity;	costly	signals	are	harder	to	fake	than																																																									45	Ibid.,	pg.	116.	
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inexpensive	signals.46		We	can	regard	religious	signals	to	be	“binding”	in	another	sense	when	we	understand	what,	exactly,	is	being	communicated	by	the	signaler	in	his	or	her	participation	in	a	given	religious	practice.		Signaling	one’s	affiliation	with	a	particular	religion	is	not	like	wearing	a	name	badge—it	communicates	so	much	more	than	just	assent	to	a	particular	religious	worldview	and	a	desire	to	reap	the	benefits	of	group	membership.		Religious	signaling	communicates	shared	values,	shared	priorities,	one’s	intention	to	belong	to	the	group,	one’s	intention	to	make	sacrifices	for	the	group,	one’s	intention	to	treat	the	other	individuals	of	the	group	as	of	one’s	“in-group,”	etc.		So,	signaling	religious	affiliation	is	“binding”	in	the	sense	that	it	allows	others	to	expect	certain	things	of	the	signaler.				 Signaling	religious	affiliation	is	“binding”	in	one	final	aspect:		religious	belief	holds	a	privileged	place	in	peoples’	lives	and	in	society.		One’s	religious	beliefs	encompass	the	individual;	a	society’s	religious	beliefs	act	as	guiding	principles,	core	values,	and	social	norms.		Signals	based	on	non-religious	ideology	could	very	well	be	used	to	communicate	group	identity;	it	seems	religious	signaling,	however,	enjoys	a	unique	ability	to	communicate	to	others	the	way	that	one	sees	oneself	and	one’s	relationship	to	the	world,	to	the	divine,	and	to	other	people.		Truly,	religious	signaling	is	difficult	(and	risky)	to	fake,	as	it																																																									46	“Inexpensive	signals,”	in	the	realm	of	religious	belief,	might	include	things	like	verbal	commitment,	mere	profession	of	a	belief,	etc.		“Costly”	religious	signals	include	things	like	participation	in	community	ritual,	spending	valuable	resources	and	time	demonstrating	one’s	devotion	to	a	religious	system,	denying	one’s	desires	and	interests	in	commitment	to	a	religious	system	that	urges	pro-social	or	altruistic	behavior,	etc.		It	is	these	“costly”	signals	that	make	religious	identification	hard	to	fake.		Sure,	anyone	can	commit	verbally	to	a	belief	system.		The	idea	is	that	one’s	access	to	group	membership	would	be	contingent	on	one’s	willingness	to	spend	the	resources	on	these	signals.		“Costly”	signals	are	hard	to	fake,	as	religions	tend	to	be	demanding.		The	costs	of	being	“found	out”	might	include	ostracism	or	the	withholding	of	the	benefits	of	group	membership.		(Or	things	like	being	stoned	to	death,	or	being	burnt	at	the	stake.)	
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signals	core	metaphysical	commitments.		Groups	that	signal	god-beliefs	in	religious	ritual	or	in	religious	organization	enjoy	an	added	benefit	of	being	pronouncedly	tight-knit	(Norenzayan	&	Shariff,	2008)—this	helps	to	explain	why	religion	and	the	signaling	of	religious	affiliation	were	favored	over	alternative	kinds	of	society-organizing	belief	systems	and	the	signaling	associated	with	them.	
God-beliefs	might	also	be	appropriately	conceived	of	as	a	social	gatekeeper.		If	the	ability	to	successfully	signal	a	religious	worldview	is	what	confers	to	you	the	crucial	benefits	of	belonging	to	the	larger	group,	then	those	benefits	are	not	conferred	if	the	signal	is	not	sent.		Religious	and	ritual	adherence	might,	in	a	literal	sense,	be	a	ticket	to	the	adaptive	benefits	of	group	membership—both	in	our	evolutionary	past	and	in	the	present.		It	might	be	worth	clarifying	that	the	“rituals”	that	serve	as	costly	signals	may	be	as	“primitive”	as	things	like	initiation	rites,	or	as	“modern”	as	things	like	church	attendance.		No	matter	where	one	is	along	the	spectrum	of	cultural	religious	practices,	the	idea	is	that	such	a	signal	is	initially	costly,	but	then	eventually	yields	a	return.		All	of	this	is	not	to	say	that	there	are	not,	in	fact,	costs	associated	with	our	god-beliefs	(particularly,	our	refined	
god-beliefs).		Rather,	it	is	just	the	claim	that	the	benefits	of	such	beliefs—the	benefits	associated	with	group	membership	and	inclusion—come	to	far	outweigh	the	initial	costs	both	of	believing	a	certain	way	and	signaling	those	beliefs.	
C-2.		Health	&	Well	Being			 Another	approach	in	determining	the	adaptive	benefit	of	religion	and	god-beliefs	is	in	the	direct	psychological	study	of	modern	religious	adherents.		Whatever	benefit	or	cost	can	be	found	in	the	study	of	modern	religiosity	is	useful	for	us,	in	as	much	as	these	costs	and	benefits	tell	us	about	the	costs	and	benefits	of	the	religious	systems	of	our	evolutionary	
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past.		To	whatever	extent	present	day	religious	beliefs	are	like	the	beliefs	of	our	ancestors,	such	psychological	studies	may	contribute	to	answering	the	question	of	whether	or	not	religion	is	an	adaptation.		Psychologist	Kenneth	Pargament	(2002)	has	conducted	research	in	this	area.		He	lists	the	conditions	under	which	religious	beliefs	confer	well-being	or	harm	to	their	adherents:	Some	forms	of	religion	are	more	helpful	than	others.		A	religion	that	is	internalized,	intrinsically	motivated,	and	built	on	a	belief	in	a	greater	meaning	in	life,	a	secure	relationship	with	God,	and	a	sense	of	spiritual	connectedness	with	others	has	positive	implications	for	well-being.		Conversely,	a	religion	that	is	imposed,	unexamined,	and	reflective	of	a	tenuous	relationship	with	God	and	the	world	bodes	poorly	for	well-being,	at	least	in	the	short	term.47			Pargament	focused	his	research	on	the	modern	American	religious	landscape,	but	I	believe	his	findings	also	give	us	structure	for	understanding	the	adaptive	costs	and	benefits	of	other	non-Western	or	non-modern	religions.			There	are	certain	key	themes	in	Pargament’s	findings	that	can	serve	as	criteria	for	evaluating	the	adaptive	advantage	or	disadvantage	of	religious	worldviews	that	look	quite	different	from	Western	theism.		Such	criteria	include	the	successful	internalization	of	religious	beliefs,	the	intrinsic	motivation	of	one’s	religious	practices/behavior,	a	sense	of	greater	meaning	as	derived	from	one’s	religious	beliefs,	a	sense	of	spiritual	security	as	conferred	by	one’s	religious	beliefs,	and	a	sense	of	spiritual	connectedness	with	others.		It	is	up	for	empirical	research	to	decide	this,	but	I	would	imagine	that	even	absent	a	literal	concept	of	“God,”	if	a	given	religion,	spiritual	worldview,	or	cultural	practice	meets	the	benefit-conferring	structure	outlined	by	Pargament,	we	might	reasonably	expect	it	to	confer	the	same	well-being	and	benefits	that	the	particular	religions	Pargament	studied	did																																																									47	Pargament,	2002,	pg.	177.	
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in	fact	confer.		Given	this,	it	is	not	belief	in	“God,”	per	se,	that	confers	such	benefits;	rather,	the	psychological	benefits	are	products	of	the	structure	of	the	religion.		In	principle,	such	benefits	could	be	had	with	a	strictly	secular	worldview,	were	it	a	secular	worldview	structured	so	as	to	facilitate	the	common	themes	studied	by	Pargament.		Pargament	also	drew	conclusions	about	which	types	of	people	most	benefit	from	the	types	of	religion	he	studied:	Not	everyone	experiences	the	same	benefits	from	religion.		Religiousness	is	more	helpful	to	more	socially	marginalized	groups	(e.g.,	older	people,	African	Americans,	women,	poor	people)	and	to	those	who	are	more	religiously	committed.		Religious	beliefs	and	practices	appear	to	be	especially	valuable	in	more	stressful	situations…	that	push	people	to	the	limits	of	their	own	personal	and	social	resources.		Some	evidence	also	suggests	that	religion	is	particularly	helpful	to	Roman	Catholics	dealing	with	controllable	life	stressors	and	to	Protestants	coping	with	uncontrollable	life	events.48			Pargament	summarizes	that	the	“efficacy	of	religion	depends	on	the	degree	to	which	it	is	well	integrated	into	peoples’	lives.”		Individuals	who	most	benefit	from	their	religion	are	ones	who	are	a	part	of	a	social	environment	that	encourages	their	faith.		Also	benefiting	are	those	who	are	best	able	to	blend	their	“religious	beliefs,	practices,	and	motivations	harmoniously	with	each	other.”		Conversely,	individuals	who	did	not	fit	those	descriptions—individuals	whose	religious	identity	is	not	supported,	whose	religion	is	unfit	for	their	problems,	and	whose	beliefs	and	practices	“lack	coherence	with	each	other”—received	harm.		Individuals	who	were	unable	to	fully	integrate	their	religious	beliefs	actually	suffered	in	their	well-being.		 Pargament	(2002)	mentions	marginalized	groups	as	those	people	who	benefit	particularly	well	from	religion	(because	religious	beliefs	are	embedded	more	deeply	into																																																									48	Ibid.,	pg.	178.	
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their	culture)	and	stressful	situations	as	those	events	that	best	elicit	particular	benefit	from	religious	beliefs	(because	faith	is	an	effective	coping	mechanism	in	response	to	events	outside	of	one’s	control).		As	has	already	been	mentioned,	what	needs	to	be	empirically	studied	is	whether	or	not	non-religious	worldviews	confer	psychological	well-being	to	their	adherents,	if	the	benefit-conferring	conditions	of	these	religious	belief	systems	(Pargament’s	internalization,	intrinsic	motivation,	coherence,	etc.)	are	met	by	the	non-religious	worldviews.		It	is	unclear	how	salient	a	factor	religion	itself	is	in	these	psychological	studies—the	more	salient	factors	could	be	the	social	and	psychological	factors	we	have	discussed.			One	way	to	interpret	Pargament’s	findings	is	that	the	psychological	well-being	was	not	conferred	by	the	religious	beliefs	at	all,	but	by	the	ability	of	an	individual	to	internalize	their	chosen	worldview,	be	a	part	of	a	supportive	community,	come	up	with	a	coherent	worldview,	etc.		One	might	contend	that	it	is	not	religious	belief	itself	that	confers	adaptive	benefit,	but	rather	the	psychological	ability	to	cope	with	the	worldviews	provided	by	such	religious	beliefs.		After	all,	some	of	Pargament’s	most	important	findings	detail	how	it	is	the	people	who	have	not	fully	integrated	religion	into	their	lives	that	are	more	psychologically	at	risk.		Anyhow,	all	of	that	aside,	Pargament	would	probably	insist	that	the	most	fitness-enhancing	religions	are	the	ones	that	produce	believers	who	can	meet	those	criteria	for	receiving	psychological	benefits;	if	a	religion	can	facilitate	the	psychological	well-being	of	its	adherents,	it	is	properly	regarded	as	fitness-conferring.		The	religions	that	cannot	facilitate	those	things	actually	do	psychological	harm	to	adherents	(i.e.,	lead	their	lukewarm	adherents	into	resource-demanding	cognitive	dissonance).		The	individuals	
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within	successful	religions	who	do	not	meet	the	various	standards	(internalization,	intrinsic	motivation,	etc.)	also	suffer	costs	accordingly.	There	is	also	an	important	relationship	between	religion	and	behaviors	that	are	conducive	to	physical	health.		Biologist	Robert	Trivers	(2011)	discusses	this	relationship.		He	recognizes	that	religions	often	encourage	healthy	behavior,	and	he	references	the	effects	of	religious	belief	on	improved	immune	function.		Trivers	also	cites	the	positive	effect	of	music	on	immune	function.		Medicine	and	music	both	provide	placebo	benefits	to	some,	and	both	were	“originally	embedded”	within	religion.49		However,	many	of	the	health	benefits	of	religious	belief	and	affiliation	might	be	due	to	the	benefits	of	positive	belief	and	group	membership,	in	general,	and	not	to	religious	belief,	in	particular.		But,	insofar	as	religious	belief	facilitates	an	individual’s	positive	belief	and	membership	in	a	supportive	group—i.e.,	insofar	as	religious	belief	confers	to	the	believer	the	advantages	that	come	with	those	things—then	religious	belief	is	rightly	considered	to	be	incredibly	beneficial.		Trivers	also	discusses	the	positive	immune	effects	of	disclosing	trauma,	and	he	contends	that	religious	disciplines	like	confessionals	and	private	prayers	may	each	facilitate	this	benefit.50	These	things	taken	together,	a	strong	case	can	be	made	for	the	positive	effects	of	religion	on	physical	and	psychological	health.		Over	the	course	of	cultural	evolution,	we	would	expect	the	religions	and	cultural	practices	that	facilitate	psychological	and	physical	well-being	to	be	successful	relative	to	belief	systems	that	do	not.		As	we	have	seen,	one	issue	of	contention	is	how	salient	a	factor	religious	belief	itself	actually	is;	it	is	possible	that	the	more	efficacious	factors	are	things	like	positive	belief	and	supportive	group																																																									49	Trivers,	2011,	pg.	279.	50	Ibid.,	pg.	287.	
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membership,	in	general.		Regardless,	in	as	much	as	religion	facilitates	beneficial	things	like	positive	belief	and	supportive	group	membership,	religion	can	itself	be	appropriately	construed	as	an	adaptively	advantageous	strategy.	
C-3.		Group	Cohesion	&	Pro-Social	Behavior		 Psychologists	Ara	Norenzayan	and	Azim	Shariff	(2008)	discuss	the	adaptive	advantages	of	religious	beliefs,	relative	to	the	development	of	large-scale	societies	and	pro-social	behavior:	Religious	prosociality,	thus,	may	have	softened	the	limitations	that	kinship-based	and…	reciprocity-based	altruism	place	on	group	size.		In	this	way,	the	cultural	spread	of	religious	prosociality	may	have	facilitated	the	rise	of	stable,	large,	cooperative	communities	of	genetically	unrelated	individuals.51		The	cognitive	awareness	of	gods	is	likely	to	heighten	prosocial	reputational	concerns	among	believers,	just	as	cognitive	awareness	of	human	watchers	does	among	believers	and	nonbelievers	alike.		However,	supernatural	monitoring,	to	the	degree	that	it	is	genuinely	believed	and	cognitively	salient,	offers	the	powerful	advantage	that	cooperative	interactions	can	be	observed	even	in	the	absence	of	social	monitoring.52			Because	kinship	selection	mechanisms	and	reciprocal	altruism	models	put	a	biological	cap	on	the	size	of	social	groups,	the	rise	of	large	communities	of	genetically	unrelated	individuals	needs	explaining.		Norenzayan	and	Shariff	propose	that	it	is	religious	pro-sociality	that,	in	fact,	enabled	societies	to	move	past	the	restrictions	placed	on	group	sizes	by	the	relatively	weak	human	ability	to	monitor	group	members’	behavior;	it	was	the	pro-social	behavior	that	resulted	from	religious	beliefs,	they	argue,	that	facilitated	the	rise	of	larger	societies.		In	short:		if	religion	provides	a	God	or	god-concept	that	serves	to	monitor	my	neighbor’s	behavior	in	a	way	that	I	cannot,	then	that	God	or	god-concept	will	effectively																																																									51	Norenzayan	&	Shariff,	2008,	pg.	58.	52	Ibid.,	pg.	58.	
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facilitate	my	trusting	my	neighbor,	my	good	faith	toward	my	neighbor,	and	my	continued	altruism	toward	my	neighbor.		Further,	if	a	God	or	god-concept	provided	by	a	religious	system	can	stand	in	to	facilitate	a	behavior	toward	strangers	that	mirrors	my	behavior	toward	my	kin	or	toward	those	who	have	acted	altruistically	toward	me,	then	such	a	God	or	god-concept	can	be	expected	to	contribute	to	the	growth	and	stability	of	a	group	entity.	Norenzayan	and	Shariff	discuss	the	effects	of	religious	belief	on	group	cohesion	in	particular:	…	religious	behavior	that	signals	genuine	devotion	would	be	expected	to	mobilize	greater	cooperation	and	trust,	and	when	internal	and	external	threats	to	group	survival	are	high,	religious	groups	would	be	expected	to	outlast	secular	ones…	large	societies	that	have	successfully	stabilized	high	levels	of	cooperative	norms	would	be	more	likely	than	smaller	ones	to	espouse	belief	in	morally	concerned	gods	who	actively	monitor	human	interactions.53		Attitudinal	surveys	show	that	religious	individuals	are	perceived	to	be	more	trustworthy	and	more	cooperative.54			Norenzayan	and	Shariff	conclude	that,	to	whatever	extent	religious	belief	can	be	effectively	signaled,	then	it	might	enhance	in-group	personal	trust,	lower	the	costs	of	monitoring	others’	behavior,	and	then	eventually	reinforce	intra-group	pro-social	tendencies.		In	small-scale	societies,	freeloading	is	not	much	of	an	issue,	as	the	behaviors	of	individuals	can	be	easily	monitored.		However,	in	larger-scale	societies,	the	behavior	of	individuals	is	much	more	difficult	to	keep	track	of;	as	such,	in	larger-scale	societies	freeloading	is	a	weightier	issue.		So,	religion	might	properly	be	regarded	as	a	successful	anti-freeloading	adaptation,	by	which	committed	individuals	are	pressured	to	cooperate	not	by	other	individuals,	but	by	
																																																								53	Ibid.,	pg.	59.	54	Ibid.,	pg.	60.	
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God,	god-concepts,	or	religious	systems	of	moral	norms,	obligations,	and	expectations.		The	cost	of	such	signals	holds	the	signalers	accountable	to	their	commitments.		 Many	of	Norenzayan	and	Shariff’s	(2007)	conclusions	are	based	on	research	they	conducted	in	the	area	of	religious	primes	and	economic	games.		Their	findings	are	fascinating:		priming	their	subjects	implicitly	with	God-concepts	led	their	subjects	to	allocate	more	money	to	an	anonymous	stranger,	relative	to	when	a	neutral	(or	no)	concept	was	activated.		Their	conclusions	are	that	the	implicit	activation	of	religious	concepts	gave	individuals	a	greater	tendency	toward	pro-social,	moral	behavior.		They	propose	two	explanations	of	the	pro-social	behavior	(2007):		(1)	such	God-concepts	are	unconsciously	linked	to	concepts	of	generosity,	and	when	a	God-concept	is	activated	there	is	an	“ideomotor”	effect	(a	power	of	suggestion)	on	generosity,	and	(2)	the	activation	of	a	God-concept	activates	in	the	subjects	a	“felt	presence	of	supernatural	watchers.”		I	see	no	reason	why	both	cannot	be	the	case;	if	god-concept	primes	have	an	“ideomotor”	effect	on	more	generous	behavior,	it	might	be	that	the	god-concept	primes	have	an	“ideomotor”	effect	on	the	notion	of	an	all-seeing	watcher	and	any	pro-social	behavior	associated	with	that.		 Interestingly,	the	pro-social	effect	was	activated	just	as	strongly	when	subjects	were	primed	with	concepts	associated	with	secular	moral	authority—government	primes,	police	primes,	law	primes,	etc.		Norenzayan	and	Shariff	(2008)	discuss	these	findings	and	the	rise	of	morally	“reliable”	secular	institutions:	Although	religions	continue	to	be	powerful	facilitators	of	prosociality	in	large	groups,	they	are	not	the	only	ones.		The	cultural	spread	of	reliable	secular	institutions,	such	as	courts,	policing	authorities,	and	effective	contract-enforcing	mechanisms,	although	historically	recent,	has	changed	the	course	of	human	prosociality.		Consequently,	active	members	of	modern	secular	organizations	are	at	least	as	likely	to	report	donating	to	charity	as	active	members	of	religious	ones…	there	are	many	examples	of	modern,	large,	cooperative,	and	not	very	religious	
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societies…	that,	nonetheless,	retain	a	great	degree	of	intragroup	trust	and	cooperation.55			So,	both	“God-concept”	and	“secular	moral	authority	concept”	primes	lead	individuals	to	greater	pro-social	behavior.		This	is	a	matter	to	be	settled	by	empirical	psychologists,	but	it	seems	that	the	common	thread	between	those	two	kinds	of	primes	are	the	notions	of	“authority”	and	“being	watched.”		Regardless	of	whether	the	prime	is	a	God-authority	or	a	secular-authority,	it	might	be	the	activation	of	an	“authority”	concept	that	is	sufficient	for	the	activation	of	the	tendency	toward	pro-social,	morally	responsible	behavior.		That	we	have	social,	moral	authorities	that	are	secular	is	a	distinctly	modern	phenomenon—it	might	be	that	our	“moral	authority”	concepts	are	so	conceptually	related	to	our	“God”	concepts	that	the	activation	of	a	“secular	moral	authority	concept”	actually	activates	our	“God”	concepts,	too.		There	is	much	ground	for	insightful	empirical	work,	here.		At	the	very	least,	the	two	(“God”	concepts	and	“secular	moral	authority”	concepts)	are	sufficiently	related,	such	that	the	activation	of	each	individually,	independent	from	the	intended	activation	of	the	other,	successfully	yields	pro-social	behavior.		 The	information	provided	by	Norenzayan	and	Shariff	gives	us	good	reason	to	suppose	that	“God	concepts”	might	have	helped	to	facilitate	the	rise	of	large,	stable	societies	in	our	evolutionary	past.		These	concepts	are	thought	to	engender	intra-group	trust	and	cooperation,	and	they	are	thought	to	have	contributed	to	the	emergence	of	particular	kinds	of	groups	that	would	have	been	more	successful	than	their	rivals	(i.e.,	the	kinds	of	groups	in	which	individuals	are	primed	by	their	culture	and	religion	for	pro-social	behavior).		Contemporary	studies	of	these	pro-social	religious	primes	(and	now	secular																																																									55	Norenzayan	&	Shariff,	2008,	pg.	62.	
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primes)	are	glimpses	into	our	evolutionary	past	that	help	us	to	understand	the	inner	workings	of	our	ancestors	and	their	developing	societies.		Further,	they	reveal,	to	some	extent,	the	evolutionary	effect	that	religious	beliefs	and	systems	might	have	had	on	them	socially.	
C-4.		Religion	as	Costly		 Given	current	events,	it	might	seem	strange	that	I	am	arguing	that	religious	beliefs	are	advantageous,	in	any	sense.		Indeed,	the	responsibility	for	much	violent	conflict	in	historical	and	modern	times	belongs	to	those	motivated	by	religious	reasons	or	by	religious	conflict.		Crusades,	Inquisitions,	and	witch	hunts,	for	instance,	were	carried	out	for	the	glory	of	God;	the	rise	and	fall	of	Islamic	kingdoms	in	the	Middle	East	has	been	characterized	by	religious	conquest	and	Sunni-Shi’a	ideological	disputes;	the	distinctly	modern	threats	of	terrorism,	violent	religious	extremism,	and	religious	persecution	are	carried	out	by	practitioners	from	nearly	every	primary	world	religion;	entire	minority	groups	are	wiped	from	existence	in	religiously-motivated	genocide;	and	religious	conflict	steers	many	nations’	geopolitics	and	military	engagement.		 In	light	of	these	things,	a	statement	like,	“Religious	belief	is	adaptively	advantageous,”	might	seem	absurd.		After	all,	none	of	those	consequences	of	religious	belief	is	“advantageous”	in	any	normal	sense	of	the	word.		I	must	concede,	of	course,	that	religious	conflict	is	indeed	costly.		When	religious	conflict	becomes	war,	it	is	impossible	to	deny	that	the	economic,	societal,	and	human	tolls	of	“religion”	are	frighteningly	high.		So,	in	order	for	me	to	maintain	that	religious	beliefs	are	advantageous,	I	must	do	so	in	light	of	these	undeniable	truths.		My	claim	must	be	that,	despite	these	apparent	costs,	god-beliefs	yield	to	us	a	net	adaptive	advantage.			
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	 We	will	begin	with	religious	war	and	conflict.		It	seems	impossible	to	say	that	religious	belief	is	adaptively	beneficial	to	individuals	engaged	in	religious	conquest—be	it	religious	conflict	on	the	scale	of	the	Crusades,	or	religious	conflict	between	two	neighboring	tribes.		Clearly,	sincerely	held	religious	beliefs	are	detrimental	to	one	who	dies	in	religious	conflict	(assuming,	of	course,	that	it	was	a	religious	belief	that	landed	this	individual	or	his	society	in	violent	conflict).		Religious	beliefs	are	equally	costly	to	the	culture	that	is	wiped	out	either	by	forced	assimilation	into	an	invading	religious	society	or	by	a	catastrophic	loss	of	population	in	violent	conflict.		Put	in	very	crass	terms,	religious	belief	is	costly	to	the	losers	of	religious	conflict.		However,	what	is	religious	belief	to	the	
winners	of	religious	conflict?		I	propose	that,	for	the	victors	of	religiously	motivated	conflict,	religion	is	a	successful	tool	of	conquest;	it	is	a	unifier,	motivator,	justifier,	and	cultural	symbol.		Religion	provides	justification	for	going	to	war	(and	for	reaping	the	benefits	of	war).		Certainly,	there	are	material	and	human	losses	to	all	sides	in	nearly	every	violent	religious	conflict;	however,	there	are	also	winners	in	most	such	conflicts.		For	a	given	society,	for	instance,	war	is	a	great	means	of	material	gain—an	enemy’s	resources,	an	enemy’s	population,	an	enemy’s	strategic	location,	an	enemy’s	exploited	labor,	etc.			
	 It	is	true	that	the	winners	of	religiously	motivated	conflict	also	suffer	losses	of	resources	and	life.		I	can	grant	this,	however,	and	simultaneously	maintain	that	religious	belief	is	adaptively	advantageous	at	the	group	level,	as	long	as	the	society	in	question	gains	more	than	it	loses—resources,	location,	ideological	supremacy,	the	population	of	a	conquered	people,	etc.		Certainly,	at	least	some	religiously	motivated	conflicts	in	evolutionary	history	have	resulted	in	a	net	loss	for	a	religious	group.		However,	my	position	(that	refined	god-belief	is	a	winning	strategy)	depends	only	on	the	proposition	that	
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religious	conflicts	resulted	in	a	net	gain	for	those	involved	of	the	religious	sort.		In	this	way,	
refined	god-belief	can	be	conceived	of	as	adaptive,	even	in	light	of	the	resources	lost	by	the	winning	side.		It	is	worth	noting,	too,	that	warriors	can	be	killed	and	crops	burned	(or	whatever),	but	that	religious	concepts	and	ideas	are	not	similarly	destructible.		Losses	that	are	short	of	catastrophic	to	a	religious	group	that	has	“won”	(or	lost)	a	given	conflict	might	serve	to	galvanize	their	religious	concepts,	stories,	and	culture.		Whatever	the	case,	success	at	war	is	a	great	way	to	mitigate	competition	with	neighboring	groups.		At	the	cultural	level,	war	is	also	a	successful	strategy	of	ideological	conquest:		how	better	to	ensure	the	spread	of	a	society’s	beliefs	and	values	than	by	that	society’s	imposition	of	its	beliefs	upon	neighboring	populations?		 If	religion	can	be	properly	conceived	of	as	a	motivator	for	war	and	conquest,	as	I	believe	it	can,	and	if	the	benefits	of	war	to	a	society	and	to	its	individuals	sometimes	outweigh	the	costs,	then	a	case	can	be	made	that	religiously	motivated	war	is	actually,	in	at	least	some	cases,	beneficial	to	the	culture	or	society	that	holds	those	religious	beliefs.56		Thus,	the	genes	and	ideologies	of	the	people	who	hold	to	those	religious	beliefs	enjoy	relative	success	in	the	next	generation.		Certainly,	the	costs	of	religious	war	are	massive,	and	these	costs	reflect	negatively	upon	the	advantageousness	of	religious	belief	to	whatever	extent	sincere	religious	believers	are	the	losers	in	a	given	conflict.		However,	such	conflicts	also	have	winners,	and	the	winners	enjoy	benefits;	to	whatever	extent	sincere	religious	believers	(individual	or	group)	“win”	in	a	given	conflict,	the	benefits	reflect	positively	upon	the	advantageousness	of	the	winner’s	religious	beliefs.		Presumably,	to	whatever	extent	god-beliefs	make	a	society	better	at	war—for	instance,	to	whatever	extent																																																									56	That	is,	in	these	cases	religion	helps	to	further	the	survival	and	spread	of	that	culture.	
	65	
fighting	for	religious	reasons	emboldens	an	army,	makes	the	army	fearless	of	death,	etc.—	such	god-beliefs	yield	to	that	society	even	further	benefit.		 Let	it	be	known	that	in	using	terms	like	“winner”	and	“successful	strategy,”	I	am	not	advocating	for	religious	war	or	providing	justification	for	religious	war—that	much	should	be	clear!		Rather,	I	mean	to	show	that	there	is	more	to	the	relationship	between	religious	conflict	and	evolution	than	just	massive	cost;	in	fact,	there	are	winners.		I	also	think	it	helpful	to	point	out	that	massively	costly	conflict	is	not	unique	to	religious	belief.		Secular	and	atheist	states	have	committed	atrocities	against	humanity	without	religious	motivation	or	justification;	see	Hitler’s,	Stalin’s,	and	Mao’s	contributions	to	the	bloody	twentieth	century.		The	carnage	wrought	in	these	situations	is	ideological,	but	it	is	not	characterized	by	god-beliefs.		I	mention	this,	because	religion	has	far	from	cornered	the	market	in	armed	conflict;	societies	are	perfectly	capable	of	finding	reason	for	going	to	war	with	other	societies,	or	of	finding	justification	for	the	eradication	of	minority	groups	from	their	population,	sans	religious	belief.		Certainly,	the	ability	to	wage	a	religious	war,	and	the	justification	for	doing	so,	is	a	byproduct	of	religious	belief;	but	human	societies	excel	at	waging	war	independent	of	religious	belief.		It	is	a	mischaracterization	of	god-beliefs	(and	of	the	history	of	violent	conflict)	to	say	that	god-beliefs	are	maladaptations	that	give	rise	to	the	human	capacity	to	kill	and	be	killed	in	war.		To	characterize	god-beliefs	in	this	way	also	betrays	an	assumption—that	the	“religious	wars”	we	observe	in	modern	times	are	truly	religious	in	nature.		Granted,	some	religious	conflict	is	truly	religious	in	nature;	other	“religious	conflict,”	however,	is	more	plausibly	political	or	geopolitical	in	nature,	with	religious	ideology	used	as	a	justification	for	conflict	or	as	a	tool	for	recruitment	to	a	cause.	
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	 Aside	from	violent	religious	conflict,	the	other	commonly	enumerated	costs	of	religious	belief	include	time,	resource	allocation	and	opportunity	cost,	pain	(physical	or	emotional),	costly	commitment	to	ritual,	adherence	to	moral	norms	and	standards	that	are	adaptively	costly,	etc.	(Sosis,	2009).		On	the	surface	of	things,	each	of	these	can	indeed	be	understood	as	a	cost.		However,	I	have	presented	evidence	(Norenzayan	&	Shariff,	2008)	for	the	conclusion	that	it	was	god-beliefs	that	helped	enable	human	groups	to	grow	beyond	the	relatively	small	group	sizes	of	our	distant	ancestors,	and	I	have	presented	Boyer	and	Bergstrom’s	(2008)	argument	that	religious	belief	is	best	understood	as	a	costly	signal.		Each	of	the	costs	listed	above,	in	addition	to	being	understood	as	evolutionarily	costly,	may	be	understood	as	an	evolutionary	investment.		If	the	organisms	that	invest	in	these	costly	practices	reap	the	adaptive	benefits	of	group	membership	and	stable	group	cohesion	(religion	as	a	costly	signal	that	yields	a	payoff),	then	such	initially	costly	practices	were	wise	adaptive	investments,	indeed.		If	the	organisms	and	societies	that	are	religious	are	made	stronger	and	more	stable	by	their	religious	beliefs,	then	the	initial	costs	that	come	with	participation	in	religion	are	just	subsumed	by	the	broader	successful	strategy	of	
refined	god-belief	that	is	implemented	at	the	group	level.		In	both	cases,	the	benefits	outweigh	the	costs.		
4.		Conclusions		 Are	our	god-beliefs	evolutionarily	costly	or	evolutionarily	beneficial?		I	have	built	a	case	for	the	net	adaptive	advantage	of	refined	god-beliefs,	by	showing	the	effects	that	religion	and	religious	behavior	have	on	an	individual’s	access	to	group	membership	(religion	as	an	adaptive	investment/costly	signal),	group	cohesion	(religion	as	a	facilitator	of	
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the	rise	of	large,	stable	societies),	pro-social	behavior	(religion	as	a	moralizing	force),	psychological	well-being	(religion	as	a	source	of	individual	security	and	well-being),	and	physical	health	(religious	proscriptions	as	conducive	to	physically	healthy	behavior).		Those	who	would	argue	that	our	god-beliefs	are	maladaptive	need	to	show	that	the	costs	of	such	beliefs	outweigh	the	benefits	that	were	surveyed	in	the	previous	section.				 The	costs	of	religious	belief	that	are	often	cited—religious	conflict	and	costly	adherence	to	social	norms,	for	instance—are	not	negligible.		Indeed,	many	people	have	died	or	lost	their	culture	in	the	name	of	god-beliefs,	and	that	seems	obviously	costly.		In	a	possible	world	in	which	there	were	no	trace	of	religious	belief,	however,	there	would	certainly	be	other	reasons	for	conflict	(like	scarcity	of	resources).		I	have	argued	that	it	was	
religion	itself	that	helped	to	facilitate	the	development	of	human	society.		In	so	far	as	religion	facilitates	group	cooperation	and	the	benefits	that	come	with	it	(group	membership,	group	cohesion,	and	altruism),	religion	ought	to	be	regarded	as	immensely	beneficial.		Indeed,	for	there	to	be	recognizable	human	societies	or	cultures	in	another	possible	world	that	lacks	god-beliefs,	some	other	societal	glue	would	be	needed	to	stand	in	for	“religion”	and	its	role	in	the	cohesion	of	society.		In	our	world,	it	was	religion	that	in	fact	served	as	this	glue.		In	the	imagining	of	a	world	without	religious	conflict	(and	therefore	without	religious	belief	or	its	evolutionary	benefits),	perhaps	we	can	have	our	cake	and	eat	it,	too;	but	perhaps	we	cannot.				 The	origins	of	our	god-beliefs	cannot	be	adequately	explained	by	appeal	to	selective	pressures	occurring	at	the	genetic	level.		The	foundations	of	religious	belief—raw	god-
belief—are	not	adaptations	that	were	selected-for.		Rather,	what	was	selected	were	cognitive	mechanisms	that	yield	byproduct	raw	god-beliefs.		These	mechanisms	compose	a	
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religion-generating	cognitive	suite,	the	RGCMs	of	which	operate	in	evolutionarily	unintended	domains	to	yield	their	byproducts.		The	religion-generating	cognitive	suite	facilitates	the	formation	of	byproduct	god-beliefs,	and	these	byproducts	are	developed	over	time	by	cultures	into	refined	god-beliefs;	these	refined	systems	of	belief	are	the	adaptively	advantageous	traits	of	groups	and	cultures.		That	is,	they	yield	certain	behaviors	that	are	beneficial	to	both	groups	and	individuals.		The	processes	of	multi-level	selection	do	their	work	on	these	consequent	behaviors	and	group-organismic	traits.		Individuals	and	societies	with	the	proper	kinds	of	religious	stories	to	tell	(refined	god-beliefs)	would	have	yielded	adaptively	advantageous	behaviors	and	survived	disproportionately	well,	relative	to	those	without	the	right	kinds	of	adaptively	advantageous	refined	god-beliefs.		 I	have	advocated	for	a	fusion	of	the	Byproduct	and	Adaptationist	accounts	for	the	phenomenon	of	religious	belief.		I	have	argued	that	our	raw	god-beliefs	are	the	cognitive	byproducts	of	brains	like	the	ones	that	we	have,	and	that	our	refined	god-beliefs	are	formed	by	human	processes	of	learning	(including,	for	the	theist,	revelation),	rationalization,	meme	transmission,	and	group-level	selection.		Raw	god-beliefs	are	the	architectural	spandrels	of	our	cognitive	mechanisms—the	spaces	between	the	“arches”	of	our	cognition.		The	content	of	our	refined	god-beliefs	is	determined	by	cultural	evolution	and	the	contingencies	of	human	cultural	transmission	and	storytelling.		Modern	belief	systems	are	indeed	the	products	of	selection,	but	at	the	group	level,	rather	than	at	the	genetic	level.		These	specific	belief	systems	led	groups	and	cultures	in	our	evolutionary	past	to	behave	in	certain	ways;	these	particular	behavioral	tendencies	led	to	their	groups’	success	and,	therefore,	to	the	continued	transmission	of	their	respective	cultural	stories	and	to	the	flourishing	of	the	individuals	of	these	societies.			
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	 It	is	a	mistake	to	appeal	exclusively	to	adaptationist	stories	in	explaining	the	phenomenon	of	religious	belief,	and	it	is	a	mistake	to	conceive	of	refined	religious	beliefs	as	the	mere	byproducts	of	our	cognitive	structures.		We	need	ultimately	to	appeal	to	both	kinds	of	stories.		The	adaptationist	stories	offered	by	evolutionary	psychologists	might	be	able	to	account	for	specific	cognitive	mechanisms	(the	RGCMs),	psychological	processes,	and	belief-formation	tendencies,	but	they	fail	to	account	for	the	origins	of	the	initial	content	of	our	god-beliefs	in	a	way	that	our	byproduct	story	can.		It	is	highly	question-begging	to	posit	that	beliefs	themselves	are	selectable	at	the	genetic	level,	or	that	religious	beliefs	
themselves	(that	is,	those	beliefs	that	are	demonstrably	culturally	transmitted)	are	transmittable	genetically.		It	is	also	difficult	to	see	how	adaptationist	stories	might	explain	the	confluence	of	the	varying	systems	and	components	involved	in	religious	beliefs	and	systems—morality,	ritual,	beliefs	in	supernatural	beings,	emotional	symbolism	and	experience,	etc.—each	of	which	has	its	own	unique	evolutionary	history	apart	from	religion,	more	broadly	construed.		If	religion	just	is	the	confluence	of	these	various	systems	in	an	evolutionarily	unintended	religious	domain,	then	religion	ought	to	be	conceived	of	as	a	byproduct.		However,	that	refined	god-beliefs	are	cultural	adaptations	is	clear.		One	is	right	to	ask,	“Why,	despite	the	explanatory	alternatives	to	religion	that	we	have	at	hand,	and	despite	the	contradictions	inherent	to	many	religious	systems,	do	such	
god-beliefs	persist?”		We	might	add	to	that	question,	“Why	are	these	religious	stories	so	unified,	and	why	are	they	so	agreed	upon	within	a	given	society?”		After	all,	it	seems	strange,	given	the	ability	of	the	empirical	sciences	to	debunk	many	of	our	religious	claims,	that	religion	remains	as	ubiquitous	as	it	is.		If	religion	is	properly	conceived	of	as	a	“virus	of	the	mind,”	should	we	not	expect	science	and	technology	to	serve	as	capable	“anti-viral”	
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medications?		As	I	mentioned	a	bit	earlier,	some	of	these	religious	beliefs	actually	fit	quite	well	into	the	intuitive	conceptual	expectations	that	we	have	for	the	world	around	us	(although,	successful	god-beliefs,	according	to	Boyer	(2001),	will	violate	conceptual	expectations	to	the	proper	degree).		Indeed,	we	should	expect	our	refined	god-beliefs,	if	they	did	evolve	from	our	intuitive	raw	god-beliefs,	to	align	consistently	with	these	religious	biases.		This	consonance	of	our	refined	god-beliefs	with	our	intuitive	understanding	of	the	world	around	us	(delivered	to	us	by	our	RGCMs)	should	only	be	expected	to	reinforce	the	various	religious	beliefs	to	which	people	hold.	In	explaining	the	persistence	of	religious	belief,	it	is	important	to	note	that,	while	our	scientific	method	has	moved	us	beyond	needing	to	posit	belief	in	God	(or	gods)	in	order	to	possess	satisfactory	explanations	of	the	phenomena	we	experience,	the	strong	Byproduct	claim	still	stands:		that,	by	virtue	of	the	way	our	brains	are	structured,	we	naturally	conceive	of	the	world	in	terms	of	god-beliefs.		The	scientific	method	and	empirical	sciences	can	lead	us	to	disavow	certain	god-beliefs,	but	I	find	it	unlikely	that	our	empirical	pursuits	will	ever	successfully	override	the	byproduct	beliefs	of	the	structures	of	our	brains;	we	cannot,	after	all,	convince	our	own	cognitive	mechanisms	to	stop	forming	byproduct	god-beliefs.		That	is,	we	cannot	step	away	from	our	own	cognition	(Kahneman,	2011).		Perhaps	religious	belief	persists,	because	our	automatic	raw	god-beliefs	persist.		To	expect	religious	belief	not	to	persist	is	to	expect	people	to	ignore	the	religious	inclinations	delivered	to	them	by	their	brains—that	things	are	designed,	that	there	is	agency	“out	there,”	that	the	objects	of	our	perception	have	mental	states,	etc.—and	to	operate	by	worldviews	that	are	very	unnatural	for	people	with	brains	like	ours	to	hold.		If	these	religious	biases	are	as	pervasive	as	I	have	made	them	out	to	be,	then	a	strictly	secular	worldview	is	actually	
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inconsistent	with	much	of	the	human	experience.		By	that,	I	mean	that	it	would	be	strange	for	one	to	deny	one’s	religiously	biased	inclinations,	if	we	assume	sufficient	ignorance	of	any	non-religious	explanation	for	the	phenomena	that	we	naturally	explain	by	appeal	to	
god-beliefs.		Add	to	this	one’s	placement	in	a	religious	cultural	context,	and	it	is	even	less	surprising	that	one’s	god-beliefs	persist	in	the	midst	of	alternative,	non-religious	ways	of	seeing	the	world.	Perhaps	the	most	obvious	explanation	one	might	offer	for	why	certain	religious	beliefs	persist	is	that	they	tell	a	true	story	about	the	way	the	world	actually	is;	or,	it	may	be	that	they	tell	a	partially	true	story	about	the	way	the	world	is.		This	is	certainly	possible.		It	is	not	possible,	however,	that	every	religious	story	explains	how	the	world	actually	is,	for	across	religious	stories	(and	within	certain	individual	stories)	there	is	great	incompatibility.		There	are	numerous	religious	traditions,	for	instance,	that	claim	to	worship	the	one,	true	(and,	therefore,	mutually	exclusive)	God.		So,	if	we	are	to	explain	why	religious	belief	persists	by	granting	that	they	might	possibly	be	true	beliefs,	we	need	to	figure	out	which	religious	beliefs	are	true	and	which	are	false.		But,	though	in	principle	possible,	that	will	take	us	far	afield	of	the	scope	of	this	paper.		Instead,	I	offer	that	religious	belief	persists,	because	religious	worldviews	are	composed	of	beliefs	that	persistently	mesh	with	the	believers’	experiences	of	the	world	around	them.		The	human	experience	yields	a	panoply	of	varying	religious	beliefs,	because	people	experience	the	world	differently	and	form	religious	beliefs	accordingly;	the	differing	religious	beliefs	persist,	because	the	beliefs’	consonance	with	the	believers’	experiences	of	the	world	around	them	persists.	If	religious	beliefs	were	outrageously	and	obviously	false	or	self-contradictory,	and	were	this	outrageous	falsity	or	self-contradiction	obvious	to	the	believer,	we	should	expect	
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these	beliefs	not	to	persist.		Similarly,	it	seems	that,	were	the	religious	beliefs	incoherent	or	conceptually	absurd,	we	would	expect	them	not	to	be	propagated	(much	as	Boyer	(2001)	insisted	with	his	model	of	intuitive	conceptual	templates).		However,	religious	belief	does	persist.		I	believe	we	are	anchored	to	our	religious	worldviews	because	1)	it	is	most	natural	for	us	to	conceive	of	the	world	in	religious	terms,	as	I	explained	earlier,	and	because	2)	these	religious	beliefs	and	explanations	are	consistently	re-confirmed	to	us	by	our	experiences	of	the	world	(which	are	either	truly	religious	in	nature,	merely	perceived	to	be	religious	in	nature,	or	simply	do	not	contradict	with	the	religious	explanations	we	have	formed	for	them).		It	is	also	likely	that	our	god-beliefs	enjoy	the	boons	of	the	various	familiarity	and	confirmation	biases	at	work	in	our	psychologies.			The	persistence	of	our	god-beliefs	might	also	be	partially	explained	by	the	rise	of	very	complicated,	rigorous,	and	systematized	refined	god-beliefs.		Such	extensive	belief	systems	have	given	rise	to	entire	fields	of	intellectual	pursuit	(theology,	anthropology,	philosophy	of	religion,	etc.).		A	belief,	or	belief	system,	should	be	expected	to	persist	more	easily	wherever	we	have	these	highly	intellectualized,	counter-intuitive	approaches	to	god-
beliefs	(remember	Barrett	&	Keil’s	“ontological	gap”	and	“theological	correctness”).		Such	approaches	to	god-beliefs	spend	considerable	effort	explaining	away	any	seeming	inconsistency	between	a	god-belief	and	the	believer’s	experience	of	the	world,	or	any	incompatibility	between	a	god-belief	and	some	contrary	body	of	evidence.		If	a	believer	(or	culture)	is	helped	to	reconcile	his	or	her	god-beliefs	with	other	ideas	or	matters	of	fact	that	are	contrary	to	his	or	her	god-beliefs,	such	reconciliation	should	be	expected	to	aid	in	the	beliefs’	persistence.		Many	refined	god-beliefs	enjoy	this	status	of	having	been	reconciled	to	
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bodies	of	evidence	(or	ideas)	that	are	to	the	contrary—thanks	to	philosophical	theology,	theistic	apologetics,	and	so	on.	As	for	why	a	given	society’s	religious	stories	seem	so	unified	and	agreed-upon,	I	believe	we	can	pursue	a	similar	explanation:		we	should	expect	one	to	assent	to	some	degree	to	an	explanatory	story,	religious	or	not,	to	the	extent	that	the	religious	story	meshes	with	one’s	experiences	of	one’s	environment.		The	fact	that	a	particular	religious	story	makes	sense	of	a	local	environment	(or,	depending	on	the	god-belief,	the	entire	cosmos)	serves,	for	many,	as	good	reason	for	buying	into	that	particular	story.		Given	that	everyone	in	a	particular	environment	will	have	very	similar	experiences	of	that	environment,	we	should	not	be	surprised	that	the	religious	explanations	of	their	environment—events,	phenomena,	the	natural	environment,	their	placement	there,	etc.—are	shared	in	common	in	the	way	that	religions	seem	to	be	shared	in	common.		The	claim	is	not	that	the	persistence	and	unity	of	religious	stories	are	rational,	or	that	they	ought	to	persist	or	ought	to	be	unified	(although,	they	may	very	well	be	rational,	and	it	may	well	be	the	case	that	believers	are	justified	in	maintaining	their	beliefs).		Rather,	my	claim	is	just	that	the	persistence	and	unity	of	religious	belief	systems	can	be	understood	by	appeal	to	the	experiences	of	believing	individuals.	The	implications	for	theism	of	an	evolutionary	account	like	mine	are,	at	this	point,	unclear.		On	the	one	hand,	that	religious	belief	is	a	byproduct	of	our	cognitive	structures	should	give	the	theist	pause,	as	should	the	idea	that	God	or	spirits	may	be	the	spandrels	of	evolutionary	processes	and	cognitive	mechanisms.		On	the	other	hand,	however,	all	of	our	cognitive	and	belief-formation	faculties	have	their	origin	in	evolutionary	processes.		At	some	level	of	generality,	the	following	holds:		if	the	theist	ought	to	be	concerned	about	the	
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justifiability	and	truth	of	his	or	her	god-beliefs	in	light	of	their	evolutionary	origins,	then	the	theist	(and	non-theist)	also	ought	to	be	concerned	about	the	justifiability	and	truth	of	other	types	of	truth	claims	we	make	about	the	world	in	light	of	their	evolutionary	origins.		To	be	sure,	many	of	our	non-religious	beliefs	are	empirically	verifiable	and	testable	in	ways	that	our	god-beliefs	are	not,	and	these	standards	of	justification	serve	to	isolate	our	non-religious	beliefs	from	being	undermined	by	an	evolutionary	story.		However,	god-beliefs	may	have	their	own	standards	of	justification:		factors	like	religious	experience,	miracles,	and	reliable	testimony	may	reasonably	be	taken	to	isolate	at	least	some	of	our	god-beliefs	from	being	undermined	by	an	evolutionary	story.			Perhaps	my	raw/refined	god-belief	distinction	will	prove	useful	to	the	theist	in	this	realm:		it	may	be	that	a	byproduct	theory	of	the	origins	of	religious	beliefs	seriously	undermines	the	justification	of	raw	god-beliefs	(because	they	are	delivered	to	us	by	the	off-line,	automatic	processes	of	our	cognitive	mechanisms	functioning	in	an	improper	domain),	while	it	fails	to	similarly	undermine	the	justification	of	refined	god-beliefs	(because	they	include	claims	that	are	more	intellectually,	empirically,	and	inferentially	involved).		It	is	my	hope	that	future	research	in	this	field	will	take	on	a	more	even-handed	tone,	rather	than	beginning	with	the	presupposition	that	“All	god-beliefs	are	false.”		Certainly,	god-beliefs	are	not	false	merely	because	their	origins	can	be	explained	by	appeal	to	evolutionary	processes.			
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